

consumption externalities
 two Agents A, B

24 hours a day


Music / Silence
 M / S

A owns the rights to M/S

$$U^A(x_1^A, M)$$

$$U^B(x_1^B, S)$$

A




B

↓

Silence


AS LONG AS RIGHTS ARE WELL DEFINED PRIVATE TRADE BETWEEN A AND B CAN TAKE PLACE
 AND BENEFITS FROM TRADE CAN BE FULLY EXPLOITED IF THERE ARE NOT TRANSACTION COSTS

MUSIC



A

$$p_1 = 1$$



B

$$w^A = (w_1^A, w_2^A)$$

$$w^B = (w_1^B, w_2^B)$$

SILENCE

$$p_1 x_1^A + p_2 x_2^A = w_1^A p_1 + w_2^A p_2$$

$$w_1 p_1 x_1^B + p_2 x_2^B = w_1^B p_1 + w_2^B p_2$$

AS LONG AS RIGHTS ARE WELL DEFINED AN ORGANISED COMPETITIVE MARKET FOR THE RIGHTS TO MUSIC/SILENCE CAN BE CREATED. TRADE BETWEEN A AND B IS MEDIATED BY COMPETITIVE MARKETS

Quasi Linear Preferences

$$u^A(x_1^A, x_2^A) = x_1^A + v(x_2^A) \quad |MRS^A| = \frac{1}{v'(x_2^A)}$$

$$u^B(x_1^B, x_2^B) = x_1^B + q(x_2^B) \quad |MRS^B| = \frac{1}{q'(x_2^B)}$$


Pareto efficient interior allocation

$$\frac{1}{v'(x_2^A)} \stackrel{!}{=} |MRS^A| = |MRS^B| = \frac{1}{q'(x_2^B)}$$

$$x_2^A = 24 - x_2^B$$

IF THE DEMAND FOR THE EXTERNALITY M/S
DOES NOT DEPEND ON INCOME, PARETO EFFIC.

ALLOCATION OF M AND S DOES NOT DEPEND ON ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS



$$MRS^A = - \frac{1}{MU_2^A(x_2^A)}$$

$$MRS^B = - \frac{1}{MU_2^B(x_2^B)}$$

$$-\frac{p_1}{p_2} = MRS^A = MRS^B$$

$$p_1 = 1 \quad x_2^A(p_2) + x_2^B(p_2) = W_2 = 24$$

determines p_2^*

Coase Theorem

- ① if property rights are well defined and there are no transaction costs voluntary trade leads to Pareto efficient outcomes
- ② if the demand of the externality does not depend on income, the Pareto efficient quantity of externality does not depend on the allocation of property rights

