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| **AY 2018-2019**  Name:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Surname:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  Matricola:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  **Microeconomics II Final Test**  **2nd part**  **7 June 2019**  *Prof. Nicola Dimitri* |

# You can use the calculator if needed. Smartphones, lecture notes and books are not allowed. You have 1 hour and 30 minutes.

**1. (11 points)**

find first and second best contract (quantity and expenditure), in the buyer-seller model seen in class when .

**2. (11 points)**

Find first and second best contract in the principal-agent model seen in class when , and

**3. (11 points)**

Consider two agents, and . Agent can be of just one type while player can be of two types, and . The two agents have the following preferences over three alternatives .

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Discuss if agent has an incentive to reveal his true preferences with the following Social Choice Functions: