- Does Focality Depend on the Mode of Cognition? Experimental Evidence on Pure Coordination Games, with: E. Bilancini (IMT, Lucca) and L. Boncinelli (University of Florence), 2018, Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistica, n. 771, Università di Siena
- The impact of transactional and transformational leadership on cooperation: An experimental study, with: F. Farolfi (University of Cologne), September 2016
- Banning Ads from prime time state TV: Lessons from France with: L Filistrucchi (University of Florence) and A Mangani, (University of Pisa) September 2013, NET Institute, NYU, WP 12-23
- Vertical Complementarity Contracting in the Advertising Market, March 2015
- An experiment on the adoption of technology, (with C. Borelli), January 2015
- Information and selection: Darwin and Lamarck in the lab, December 2014
- The auto-component supply chain: Competition in capabilities, August 2012
- Peer effects in trust game experiments, (with N. O’Higgins (ILO), P. Sbriglia (University of Naples), July 2010
- TV Viewer’s Advertising Aversion: The French Natural Experiment, (with L. Filistrucchi, (University of Florence), A. Mangani, (University of Pisa), November 2009
- Export Specialization and Product Differentiation; (with A. Mangàni, (University of Pisa), August 2006
- Trademarks, Product Variety and Economic Activity in Italy and Europe, (with A. Mangàni (University of Pisa), July 2003
- Information and Learning in Bertrand and Cournot Experimental Duopolies (with P Sbriglia (University of Naples), C Altavilla (ECB), June 2003
- Vertical product differentiation and adverse selection: an experimental note (with A Mangàni (University of Pisa). May 2002
Peer Punishment in teams: Expressive or instrumental choice?
with Marco Casari, Experimental Economics,
Abstract
A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often targeted by their peers for punishment. One can interpret such peer punishment of norm violators as a second-order public good. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself as a public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment, subjects are engaged in cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment.
Demand cross elasticity without substitutability: An experiment
with Pierluigi Sabbatini; Journal of Socio-Economics
Abstract
We study a market in which goods are produced under low marginal costs with a poor degree of substitutability among products. In this environment we ran an experiment to explain why prices are interdependent even when preferences are independent. We compare our results to previous theoretical and laboratory experimental literature on price fairness. We find that even in the absence of interaction among subjects, price fairness/unfairness does play a major role in the decision to accept or reject a deal. Subjects tend to be more resistant to a price increase and reject a deal when the preferred product is not referenced to price increases of not substitute products, if these products are considered to be a benchmark for fair conduct. Thus demand cross elasticity can arise between products that are not substitutes. This result has important implications for antitrust policy. In delineating a market perimeter, fairness concerns suggest that products that are similar but not interchangeable should be included in the relevant antitrust market.
Social influence in trustors’ neighborhoods
with Annamaria Nese, Patrizia Sbriglia
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to ascertain whether trust is affected by contagion and herding in small groups of trustors who can observe each other’s choices over time. We account for three factors of trustors’ preferences, namely: risk attitude, generosity and expected trustworthiness. We test the basic hypothesis that an individual’s propensity to trust recipients in the Trust Game can be affected by the observed behavior of other trustors. Our results confirm that trust is affected by contagion effects. Furthermore, we find that specific types of agents (generous or untrusting) more often imitate the same type, when positioned in the same group. Finally, we find that untrusting individuals are less affected by their peers compared to generous individuals, and they imitate less even when positioned in groups of agents who have the same characteristics.
Regulating One Side of the Market: The French Advertising Ban on Prime Time
State Television
with Lapo Filistrucchi , Andrea Mangàni
Abstract
We analyse the effects of the advertising ban on French public television, which came into effect on the 5th of January 2009. The ban forbid commercial advertising on public TV in the time slot 20.00-6.00. We focus our analysis on the advertising market. Preliminary evidence would seem to suggest that advertising which was previously broadcasted on public TV in the time slot 20.00-6.00 did not switch to private channels in the same time slot (nor did the price in that time slot on private channels rise). Rather advertising partly switched to public TV in the time slot 6.00-20.00 and only slowly . The common expectation that the ban would favour private TV channels at the expense of public ones was therefore wrong.